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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND 
 
Corporate governance is becoming increasingly important in emerging markets. There are 
various reasons for this. Firstly, globalization has allowed investors to hold portfolios with 
foreign assets. So corporations need to improve their corporate governance in order to 
attract foreign investors. This fact has also been recognized by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance: 
“In an increasingly integrated world characterized by highly mobile capital, investors’ 
expectations for more responsive corporate governance practices are something that 
governments and companies cannot afford to ignore. This is not simply an issue relevant to 
foreign investors. Strengthening the confidence of domestic investors in a country’s own 
corporations and stock markets matters greatly to the long-term competitiveness of 
corporations and to the overall health and vitality of national economies” (OECD, 1999, p 6). 
 
Secondly, firms are becoming more and more exposed to market pressure, both in financial 
markets and products markets, because of globalization and trade liberalisation. 
Furthermore, companies have come under increasing social and ethical pressure from 
investors and the media to adopt best practices of corporate governance. However, in their 
attempt to move towards better corporate governance, corporations should be careful not 
to focus managerial attention solely on shareholder objectives. Managers must also take 
into account the interest of the other stakeholders of the firm. Corporate governance 
mechanisms should incorporate a wide range of stakeholders, both implicit and explicit. 
Thus, the concept of corporate social performance “evaluates how well firms have met 
expectations of stakeholders and environmental concerns” (McGuire et al., 2003, p 342).  
 
The Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) launched the Socially Responsible Investment 
(SRI) Index in South Africa in May 2004 to:  
• Identify those companies listed on the JSE that integrate the principles of the triple 
bottom line and good governance into their business activities;  
• Provide a tool for a broad holistic assessment of company policies and practices against 
globally aligned and locally relevant corporate responsibility standards;  
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• Serve as a facilitation vehicle for responsible investment for investors looking for non-
financial risk variables to include in investment decisions, as such risks do carry the 
potential to have significant financial impacts; and 
• Contribute to the development of responsible business practice in South Africa and 
beyond (JSE, 2010).  
The Index philosophy is founded on the principles of the three pillars of the triple bottom 
line, namely environmental, social and economic sustainability, with good corporate 
governance underpinning each.  
 
Social responsibility is considered an important corporate duty (Quinn et al., 1987). Given 
the significance of corporate social responsibility in corporate decision making, the 
relationship between a firm's social and ethical policies or actions and its financial 
performance is an important topic. 
 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Burke and Logsdon (1996) argue that a strategic implementation of social responsibility will 
result in customer loyalty, future purchases, new products, new markets, and productivity 
gains. Thus, corporate social performance may have an effect on the firm’s reputation, and 
firms may use corporate social responsibility disclosures to attract customers, attract better 
employees, increase goodwill and improve relations with bankers and investors, and thus 
facilitate greater access to capital. Therefore, corporate social performance has strategic and 
financial implications for firms, especially given the increasing power of shareholder activists 
and increasing scrutiny by the media on public companies.  
 
The growing interest in socially responsible investing has stimulated an interest in corporate 
social responsibility and how it affects, or how it is affected by, corporate social 
performance. While there is a large existing body of empirical literature which investigates 
the link between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance 
(CFP), these studies focus on developed markets. Therefore, there is a need for a study that 
analyses the relationship between CSP and CFP from an emerging market perspective. 
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This study addresses the research question: Is there a correlation between corporate social 
performance and corporate financial performance? More specifically, the study investigates 
the relationship between CSP and corporate financial performance in South African 
companies listed on the JSE.  
 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION 
 
Institutional investors buy and hold stock with the aim of generating good risk-adjusted 
financial returns. Therefore, expectations concerning the relationship between corporate 
social and financial performance are expected to play a crucial role in influencing the pattern 
of institutional investment. Much of the literature suggests that many of the financial gains 
from improved social performance accrue in the long run while social performance 
initiatives may require companies to make significant investments in the short run. Many 
authors have argued that improved social performance can contribute positively to “long-
term value creation” (Hillman and Keim, 2001, p 127). Cochran and Wood (1994), and 
Waddock and Graves (1997) have similarly argued that financial performance and social 
performance might be positively associated in the long run because improved social 
performance results in better resource competitiveness, lower transaction costs (Ruf et al., 
2001), employee quality and motivation (Moskowitz, 1972) and customer goodwill (McGuire 
et al., 1988). Furthermore, low levels of social performance may increase a firm’s financial 
risk (Ullmann, 1985) by signalling uncertain and possibly increased government regulation 
and fines (McGuire et al., 1988) and, as a result, increased uncertainty regarding the level 
and variability of future cash flow (Shane and Spicer, 1983).  
 
All this suggests that long-term investors may be more likely to show a preference for firms 
with good social performance because of its potential impact on long-run risk and return 
(Graves and Waddock, 1994). Therefore, analysis of the link between CSP and corporate 
financial performance is an important issue for portfolio managers and ethical investors who 
are primarily interested in investing in socially responsible companies. However, all the 
studies cited were conducted in developed markets. Therefore, it is not certain whether 
there is an association between CSP and CFP in emerging markets such as South Africa.  
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Since the release of the King Report on corporate governance (1994), there has been 
unprecedented interest in corporate governance in South Africa. Through this study, the 
author hopes to provide insight into the relationship between CSP and CFP in South African 
companies, and the impact of CSP on financial returns and risk in the South African market. 
 
1.4. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study is structured into six chapters. Chapter 2 explores prior research into the 
relationship between CSP and CFP. This chapter establishes the theoretical basis for this 
study, as well as the attendant research design. 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and data collection approach used in the 
study. It specifies the model used to carry out the empirical investigation.  
 
Chapter 4 is a presentation of the results obtained from the empirical investigation. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses and discusses the findings of the empirical study. This chapter draws 
comparisons between the findings of the investigation and the findings of other researchers 
on similar topics.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes the report with a summary of key findings and the implications thereof. 
It presents suggestions for direction of future research on the relationship between CSP and 
CFP.  
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2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
2.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
The ownership of large corporations is often widely dispersed as there may be many 
shareholders. This means that the ownership of the firm (principals) and the management of 
the firm (agents) become more and more separated. The shareholders are not involved in 
the day-to-day operations of the corporation and management effectively controls the 
company. This may lead to conflict of interest between the principals and the agents of the 
firm, thus giving rise to the agency problem. The concept of corporate governance resulted 
from the agency problem that arose when the ownership of companies became separated 
from the control thereof. Corporate governance ensures that the agents of the corporation 
act in the best interests of the principals.  
 
Corporate governance covers many concepts and phenomenon. Nowadays companies 
operate in a very challenging business environment, which as Harshbarger and Holden 
(2004) point out, makes the governance issues they face even more challenging.  According 
to Arjoon (2005), factors such as globalization, technology, and rising competition have 
placed greater emphasis on corporate governance and ethical issues. Byrne (2002) notes 
that corporate failures such as that of Enron have led to a re-evaluation of corporate goals, 
values and purpose. One of the core issues in the corporate governance debate is the issue 
of whether managers of corporations should focus only on the interests of shareholders, or 
whether they should serve the interests of all the stakeholders. This debate gives rise to two 
different models of corporate governance. The first model is based on shareholder wealth 
maximisation, and the second model is based on social responsibility. 
 
2.2. STAKEHOLDER THEORY 
 
According to Freeman (1984, p46), a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect 
or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives”. Friedman and Miles 
(2001) state that the organization itself should be thought of as a grouping of stakeholders 
and the purpose of the organization should be to manage their interests, needs and 
viewpoints. 
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According to Freeman (1994), stakeholder theory is based on the assumption that values are 
essentially and explicitly a part of doing business, and rejects the separation thesis, which in 
turn is based on the assumption that economic performance and social performance can be 
separated. Freeman (1994) shows that the focal point of stakeholder theory is expressed in 
two core questions. Firstly, what is the purpose of the firm? “This encourages managers to 
articulate the shared sense of the value they create, and what brings its core stakeholders 
together. This propels the firm forward and allows it to generate outstanding performance, 
determined both in terms of its purpose and marketplace financial metrics” (Freeman et al., 
2004). Secondly, what responsibility does management have to stakeholders? “This pushes 
managers to articulate how they want to do business - specifically, what kinds of 
relationships they want and need to create with their stakeholders to deliver on their 
purpose” (Freeman et al., 2004). Waddock et al. (2002) pointed out that companies receive 
pressure to adopt corporate governance practices that not only take primary stakeholders 
into consideration, but practices that also take into consideration secondary stakeholders, 
general social trends and institutional expectations. Clarkson (1995) defined primary 
stakeholders as those whose continuing participation is crucial to the continued existence of 
the company. Primary stakeholders include shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers 
and the natural environment. Secondary stakeholders are those that can influence and can 
be influenced by the company but “are not engaged in transactions with the corporation and 
are not essential for its survival” (Clarkson, 1995, p107). Waddock et al (2002) identified four 
secondary stakeholders, which are non-governmental organizations (NGOs), activists, 
communities and governments. 
 
According to stakeholder theory, the satisfaction of various stakeholder groups is important 
for organizational financial performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995). 
According to the theory, the relationships between management and stakeholders, as well 
as the negotiation and contracting that stem from those relationships, serve as monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms. This prevents managers from redirecting their focus from the 
broad financial goals of the corporation (Hill and Jones, 1992; Jones, 1995). Additionally, by 
addressing and balancing multilateral stakeholder interests, managers are able to adapt to 
external demands. Hillman and Keim (2001) stated that by developing longer-term 
relationships with primary stakeholders, corporations expand the set of value-creating 
exchanges with them beyond that which would be possible with interactions limited to 
market transaction. 
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2.3. RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM 
 
Penrose (1959) suggested viewing the firm as a "pool of resources" (Hodgson, 1998). The 
resource-based perspectives (RBP) argue that the differentials in performance are due to 
valuable and rare firm-specific resources that cannot be easily imitated by competitors and 
that cannot be easily bought or sold.  In order for a firm to use resources as a source of 
competitive advantage, the resources have to be used productively. Russo and Fouts (1997) 
assert that firms have capabilities, which are “abilities to assemble, integrate, and manage 
these bundles of resources" (Russo and Fouts, 1997, p. 537). These capabilities refer to the 
capacity of the firm to engage its organisational systems and processes to achieve its 
objectives, using its resources. Each firm has a different set of resources and capabilities, 
and according to Matthew (2002), these need to be used by firms to develop and implement 
their strategies. 
 
Resources are the elements or assets that corporations use to transform inputs into outputs. 
Resources can be categorised into tangible and intangible resources. Tangible resources are 
the physical and financial assets of the corporation and intangible assets are things such as 
corporate reputation, intellectual capital and organisational assets (corporate culture, 
human resource management policies and organisational structure). Tangible assets are 
easier to imitate or substitute than intangible assets. Intangible assets are difficult and costly 
to imitate because they tend to be “historically contextualised, path dependent, socially 
complex, and causally ambiguous” (Barney, 1999). Therefore, the intangible resources and 
capabilities tend to be a source of competitive advantage than tangible resources and 
capabilities. 
 
Orlitzky et al (2003) link corporate financial performance and corporate social performance 
using RBP. They argue that a corporation’s socially responsible activities may assist the 
corporation develop new resources and capabilities, which would lead to more efficient use 
of resources. There are empirical studies (Albinger and Freeman, 2000; Greening and 
Turban, 2000; Peterson, 2004) that have shown that the socially responsible firms have the 
ability to attract and retain better employees, which leads to reduced turnover, recruitment 
and training costs. Other studies (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Thorpe and Prakash-Mani, 2003; 
Wagner and Schaltegger, 2003) have shown that environmentally responsible firms may 
have more efficient processes, productivity improvements (as a result of redesigned 
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production processes and resources to reduce waste and increase operational efficiency), 
lower compliance costs and new market opportunities. Branco and Rodrigues (2006) 
contend that socially responsible firms may improve their corporate reputation, which in 
turn may improve relations with external stakeholders. McWilliams et al. (2006) argued that 
firms that engage in social responsibility activities can create sustainable competitive 
advantages by effectively controlling and manipulating their resources and capabilities.  
 
2.3. THE TRADE-OFF HYPOTHESIS 
 
There are two models predicting a negative relationship between CSP and CFP – the trade-
off hypothesis and the managerial opportunism hypothesis. Social responsibility involves 
financial costs to the firm. This may cause the firm to use up capital and other resources and 
put it at a competitive disadvantage compared to other less socially responsible firms 
(Friedman, 1970). Vance (1975) found that companies with strong social credentials 
experience lower stock prices compared to the market average. Therefore, Preston and 
O’Bannon (1997) noted that the higher a firm’s social performance, the lower its financial 
performance would be.    
 
2.4. THE MANAGERIAL OPPORTUNISM HYPOTHESIS 
 
Managers may pursue their own goals, which may lead to a negative relationship between 
CSP and CFP. The managerial opportunism hypothesis states that “when financial 
performance is strong, managers may attempt to “cash in” by reducing social expenditure in 
order to take advantage of the opportunity to increase their own short-term private gains. 
Conversely, when financial performance weakens, managers may attempt to offset, and 
perhaps appear to justify, their disappointing results by engaging in conspicuous social 
programs” (Preston & O’Bannon, 1997: 423). 
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2.5. CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Empirical findings on the relationship between corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance have been mixed (Ullmann, 1985; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Margolis 
and Walsh, 2003; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Wood and Jones, 1995). 
 
One group of scholars (Friedman, 1970; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Jensen, 2002) has 
argued that corporate social responsibility (CSR) raises the costs of a firm, and therefore 
places it at an economic disadvantage relative to firms that are not socially responsible. This 
group points out that the additional costs and administrative burden of engaging in socially 
responsible practices impact negatively on the firm’s profitability. Friedman (1962) states 
that management infringes on its responsibility to shareholders when they spend corporate 
funds on social causes. He asserts that these expenditures do not increase shareholder 
wealth. Aupperle et al. (1985) found a negative association between CSP and CFP because 
socially responsible firms incur costs that put them at an economic disadvantage.  
 
Another group of scholars advocates CSR for various reasons. Some argue that corporations 
with better social performance can attract resources (Cochran and Wood, 1984; Waddock 
and Graves, 1997); obtain quality employees (Greening and Turban, 2000; Turban and 
Greening, 1996); market its products and services (Fombrun, 1996; Moskowitz, 1972); and 
create unforeseen opportunities (Fombrun et al, 2000). Others (Alexander and Bucholtz, 
1978; Bowman and Haire, 1975) argue that strong social performance indicates that a firm 
possesses superior management talent that understands how to improve internal and 
external relationships through socially responsible activities. Thus, proponents of socially 
responsible investing (SRI) argue that CSR is not merely a cost but a wise investment because 
social relationships influence financial performance. This rationale is supported by 
stakeholder theory. Moskowitz (1972) ranked 67 selected firms in terms of their level of 
social responsibility. He observed that firms with higher social responsibility rankings had 
higher than average stock returns. However, in his study, Moskowitz (1972) failed to adjust 
the returns for risk. Preston and O’Bannon (1997) compared corporate social performance 
and financial performance for 67 large US corporations from 1982 to 1992 and found a 
positive link between CSP and financial performance. Stanwick and Stanwick (1998) 
conducted a regression analysis of multiple cross-sections for the period 1987 to 1992 with 
about 115 firms in each cross-section. They found a significant positive relationship between 
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corporate social performance and financial performance. Graves and Waddock’s (2000) 
empirical study suggests that firms that invest in stakeholder relations have above-average 
financial performance over an 8-year window, as measured by return on equity, return on 
assets, and return on sales. Hillman and Keim (2001) studied the market value added (MVA) 
of 308 firms within the S&P 500 and found that effective stakeholder management was 
significantly correlated with, and preceded, improved financial performance. Studies 
examining the relationship between social responsibility and accounting-based performance 
measures have generally found positive results (Bragdon and Marlin, 1972; Bowman and 
Haire, 1975; Parket and Eibert, 1975).  
 
Other studies have found no significant relationship between CSP and CFP. Alexander and 
Bucholtz (1978) used the firms listed in Moskowitz’s (1972) study and found little 
relationship between social responsibility and risk-adjusted return on securities. Chen and 
Metcalf (1980) showed that the positive association between CSR performance and financial 
performance is eliminated when they control for size. Hamilton et al. (1993) investigated the 
returns of socially responsible portfolios versus that of conventional portfolios. They found 
no significant relationship between social responsibility and the expected stock return or 
companies' cost of capital. Balabanis et al. (1998) investigated found no significant 
relationship between social responsibility and economic performance of companies in the 
UK. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) investigated the correlation between CSR and R&D and 
estimated the impact of CSR on financial performance. They found no significant relationship 
between CSR and financial performance, even after controlling for R&D. 
 
Orlitzky et al (1999) conduct a meta-analysis of 52 studies yielding a total sample size of 
33,878 observations. The meta-analytic findings have shown that (1) across studies, CSP is 
positively correlated with CFP, (2) the relationship tends to be bidirectional and 
simultaneous, (3) reputation appears to be an important mediator of the relationship, and 
(4) stakeholder mismatching, sampling error, and measurement error can explain between 
15 percent and 100 percent of the cross-study variation in various subsets of CSP–CFP 
correlations. 
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3. DATA ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. DATA 
 
Data was collected for 48 randomly selected companies listed on the FTSE/JSE All Share 
Index for the period from 2004 to 2010. In any year, some of the companies may be listed on 
JSE’s Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) Index and some may not be listed. The JSE SRI 
Index was launched in May 2004, and focuses on the triple bottom line performance of 
companies on the FTSE/JSE All Share Index. The triple bottom line philosophy is based on the 
three pillars of doing business sustainably, namely environmental, social and economic 
sustainability, with good corporate governance underpinning each. The JSE SRI Index is 
reviewed annually and constituents are included or excluded accordingly.  
 
Data on the accounting-based measures of firm performance and risk were obtained from 
the annual reports of the companies. The stock market-based measures of firm performance 
and risk were obtained and calculated from market data on Bloomberg.   
 
Following the measures used by Waddock and Graves (1997), the accounting-based financial 
performance measures used for the purposes of this study were return on assets (ROA), 
return on sales (ROS) and return on equity (ROE). Appendix A defines the measures of firm 
performance and risk that were used in the study. The ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
served as the accounting-based measure of risk. The logarithm of total assets was used as a 
proxy for the size of the companies.  
 
Daily closing prices were obtained from Bloomberg for each of the companies from 1 
January 2004 to 31 December 2010, and this data was then used to calculate the daily 
returns. The average of the daily returns was then used to calculate the annual return as 
follows: 
( ) 11 −+= nrR  
Where R is the annual return, r is the average daily return and n is the number of trading 
days per annum. Market risk measures used were beta, which is a measure of systematic 
risk, and the standard deviation of the daily returns. The logarithm of the market 
capitalization of each company each year was used as a proxy for size.  
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3.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE TEST VARIABLES 
The starting point for the empirical analysis was getting acquainted with the data. Therefore, 
the following tables present the descriptive statistics for the accounting and market data for 
each of the years under review.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics – Accounting Data  
  
ROS ROA ROE Size Risk CSP Industry 
2004 
Mean 0.13 0.10 0.11 4.02 0.08 0.56 7.65 
Standard Error 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.10 0.11 0.19 3.89 0.08 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.13 0.11 0.42 0.84 0.07 0.50 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.70 0.01 0.25 12.83 
Kurtosis 0.00 1.93 11.95 -0.57 -1.00 -2.02 -1.00 
Skewness 0.38 0.17 -3.21 0.31 0.42 -0.26 -0.38 
2005 
Mean 0.17 0.13 0.23 4.07 0.09 0.56 7.65 
Standard Error 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.10 0.12 0.24 3.94 0.07 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.20 0.13 0.29 0.83 0.08 0.50 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.69 0.01 0.25 12.83 
Kurtosis 8.25 4.20 6.65 -0.65 -0.60 -2.02 -1.00 
Skewness 2.04 0.88 -0.23 0.38 0.75 -0.26 -0.38 
2006 
Mean 0.23 0.15 0.26 4.21 0.10 0.58 7.65 
Standard Error 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.16 0.13 0.24 4.07 0.07 1.00 8.00 
Mode 0.16 0.21 0.16 3.56 0.24 1.00 11.00 
Standard Deviation 0.25 0.12 0.18 0.82 0.11 0.50 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.67 0.01 0.25 12.83 
Kurtosis 5.01 0.56 0.79 -0.71 8.27 -1.96 -1.00 
Skewness 2.01 0.89 0.60 0.46 2.32 -0.35 -0.38 
2007 
Mean 0.22 0.15 0.25 4.30 0.08 0.60 7.65 
Standard Error 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.18 0.15 0.27 4.22 0.05 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.23 0.16 0.38 0.80 0.10 0.49 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.63 0.01 0.24 12.83 
Kurtosis 2.52 5.15 26.60 -0.78 11.38 -1.89 -1.00 
Skewness 0.23 -0.67 -4.31 0.41 2.78 -0.44 -0.38 
2008 
Mean 0.21 0.15 0.30 4.43 0.10 0.60 7.65 
Standard Error 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.15 0.14 0.25 4.37 0.06 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.25 0.16 0.29 0.79 0.14 0.49 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.63 0.02 0.24 12.83 
Kurtosis 4.18 2.78 7.97 -0.72 6.79 -1.89 -1.00 
Skewness 0.81 1.15 0.35 0.31 2.57 -0.44 -0.38 
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2009 
Mean 0.15 0.10 0.22 4.44 0.11 0.65 7.65 
Standard Error 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.02 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.12 0.08 0.18 4.38 0.07 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.18 0.11 0.22 0.77 0.15 0.48 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.59 0.02 0.23 12.83 
Kurtosis 3.41 4.14 2.72 -0.67 3.69 -1.68 -1.00 
Skewness 1.40 1.61 1.43 0.36 2.04 -0.63 -0.38 
2010 
Mean 0.18 0.11 0.24 4.36 0.11 0.69 7.65 
Standard Error 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.14 0.10 0.17 4.41 0.05 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.14 0.08 0.24 1.01 0.14 0.47 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.02 0.01 0.06 1.02 0.02 0.22 12.83 
Kurtosis -0.17 0.24 9.60 6.28 3.36 -1.36 -1.00 
Skewness 0.91 0.67 2.85 -1.44 1.94 -0.84 -0.38 
 
 
Skewness indicates asymmetry and deviation from a normal distribution.  The interpretation 
of skewness in distribution analysis is as follows: 
• Skewness > 0 - Right skewed distribution - most values are concentrated on left of 
the mean, with extreme values to the right. 
• Skewness < 0 - Left skewed distribution - most values are concentrated on the right 
of the mean, with extreme values to the left. 
• Skewness = 0 - mean = median, the distribution is symmetrical around the mean. 
Kurtosis is an indicator of flattening or "peakedness" of a distribution. Its interpretation is as 
follows: 
• Kurtosis > 3 - Leptokurtic distribution, sharper than a normal distribution, with 
values concentrated around the mean and thicker tails. This means high probability 
for extreme values. 
• Kurtosis < 3 - Platykurtic distribution, flatter than a normal distribution with a wider 
peak. The probability for extreme values is less than for a normal distribution, and 
the values are wider spread around the mean. 
• Kurtosis = 3 - Mesokurtic distribution, for example a normal distribution. 
As it can be seen from the Table 1, all the variables are asymmetrical. More precisely, 
skewness is positive for four of the variables, indicating the fat tails on the right-hand side of 
the distribution. On contrary, ROE, CSP and Industry have negative skewness, which 
indicates the fat tails on the left-hand side of the distribution. The skewness value calculated 
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will rarely be equal to zero, and for real data sets can be a positive or negative number. In 
order to check if the skewness is significant, one commonly used test is to check if the 
absolute skewness value is more than the value of two standard errors of skew. Tabachnick 
and Fidell (1996) state that the standard error of skew can be estimated as 
n
6 where n is 
the sample size. So if the absolute skewness value is more than 
n
62× then there is 
significant skew in the distribution. Using this test, we can conclude that the ROS, ROA and 
accounting risk measures are all skewed to the right and the skewness is statistically 
significant. The skewness of the ROE, accounting size, CSP and Industry are not statistically 
significant.  
The kurtosis values of all variables also show that the data is not normally distributed 
because values of kurtosis are deviated from 3. ROS, ROE and accounting risk are all 
leptokurtic, i.e. more peaked and fatter tails than the normal distribution. ROA, accounting 
size, CSP and Industry are all platykurtic, i.e. their distributions are less peaked and have 
thinner tails than that of a normal distribution. In order to check if the kurtosis is significant, 
one commonly used test is to check if the absolute kurtosis value is more than the value of 
two standard errors of kurtosis. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) suggest that the standard error 
of kurtosis may be estimated as 
n
24 . Kurtosis is deemed to be significant when the 
absolute kurtosis value is greater than two standard error of kurtosis. Therefore, we can 
conclude that ROS, ROA, ROE, accounting risk and CSP have statistically significant kurtosis, 
and therefore have non-normal distributions. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Market Data 
  
Market 
Return Size 
Risk: Standard 
Deviation 
Risk: 
Beta CSP Industry 
2004 
Mean 0.14 3.78 0.02 0.55 0.56 7.65 
Standard Error 0.06 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.19 3.93 0.02 0.41 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.39 1.08 0.01 0.51 0.50 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.15 1.17 0.00 0.26 0.25 12.83 
Kurtosis 0.77 4.62 10.95 -0.12 -2.02 -1.00 
Skewness -0.37 -1.79 2.89 0.83 -0.26 -0.38 
2005 
Mean 0.36 3.95 0.02 0.67 0.56 7.65 
Standard Error 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.36 4.01 0.02 0.65 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.28 0.98 0.01 0.45 0.50 3.58 
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Sample Variance 0.08 0.96 0.00 0.21 0.25 12.83 
Kurtosis 2.31 4.49 4.13 -0.23 -2.02 -1.00 
Skewness 0.03 -1.43 1.68 0.11 -0.26 -0.38 
2006 
Mean 0.36 4.13 0.02 0.73 0.58 7.65 
Standard Error 0.04 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.31 4.14 0.02 0.72 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.30 0.98 0.01 0.43 0.50 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.09 0.96 0.00 0.18 0.25 12.83 
Kurtosis 2.57 5.65 2.46 -0.47 -1.96 -1.00 
Skewness 1.00 -1.58 -0.29 0.09 -0.35 -0.38 
2007 
Mean 0.18 4.27 0.02 0.71 0.60 7.65 
Standard Error 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.15 4.38 0.02 0.73 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.32 0.98 0.00 0.39 0.49 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.10 0.96 0.00 0.16 0.24 12.83 
Kurtosis 0.97 6.67 5.52 0.31 -1.89 -1.00 
Skewness 0.79 -1.74 -0.52 -0.07 -0.44 -0.38 
2008 
Mean -0.29 4.24 0.03 0.65 0.60 7.65 
Standard Error 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.52 
Median -0.20 4.33 0.03 0.58 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.37 0.98 0.01 0.43 0.49 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.13 0.97 0.00 0.19 0.24 12.83 
Kurtosis -0.39 6.22 1.53 0.29 -1.89 -1.00 
Skewness -0.46 -1.61 0.08 0.58 -0.44 -0.38 
2009 
Mean 0.23 4.19 0.03 0.66 0.65 7.65 
Standard Error 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.21 4.22 0.02 0.52 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.24 0.96 0.01 0.51 0.48 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.06 0.92 0.00 0.26 0.23 12.83 
Kurtosis 0.27 6.70 2.20 0.11 -1.68 -1.00 
Skewness -0.16 -1.68 0.21 0.89 -0.63 -0.38 
2010 
Mean 0.14 4.35 0.02 0.69 0.69 7.65 
Standard Error 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.52 
Median 0.13 4.29 0.02 0.56 1.00 8.00 
Standard Deviation 0.22 0.74 0.00 0.47 0.47 3.58 
Sample Variance 0.05 0.55 0.00 0.22 0.22 12.83 
Kurtosis 0.96 -0.30 6.53 -0.10 -1.36 -1.00 
Skewness 0.27 0.05 2.03 0.50 -0.84 -0.38 
 
For the market data, the only significant skewness value is that of the market size. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the market size is significantly skewed to the left. The only 
variables with kurtosis that is statistically significant are market size and CSP. Therefore, we 
can conclude that market size and CSP have non-normal distributions. 
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3.3. CORRELATION 
 
The correlation coefficient is often referred to as Pearson’s product-moment r or r 
coefficient. It may take on a range of values from -1 to 0 to +1, where the values are 
absolute and non-dimensional with no units involved. A correlation coefficient of zero 
indicates that no association exists between the measured variables. The closer the r 
coefficient approaches ± 1, regardless of the direction, the stronger is the existing 
association indicating a more linear relationship between the two variables. Positive 
correlation coefficient indicates that an increase in the first variable would correspond to an 
increase in the second variable, thus implying a direct relationship between the variables. A 
negative correlation indicates an inverse relationship whereas one variable increases, the 
second variable decreases. 
 
One of the basic assumptions of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method is that independent 
variables are not mutually correlated. If one of them is correlated with another, 
multicollinearity is said to exist. When multicolinearity is present, the regression coefficients 
become imprecise and it becomes difficult to assign the change in the dependent variable 
precisely to one or the other of the correlated explanatory variables. Therefore, since this 
study uses multivariate regression analysis, the regression analysis should commence with 
the estimation of the correlation coefficients between all the variables to be included in the 
model.  The tables below show the correlation coefficients between the accounting and 
market variables. 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients – Accounting Data 
  
ROS ROA ROE Size Risk CSP Industry 
2004 
ROS 1.00 
      ROA 0.63 1.00 
     ROE 0.49 0.70 1.00 
    Size 0.24 -0.12 0.26 1.00 
   Risk -0.17 -0.10 -0.39 -0.02 1.00 
  CSP 0.21 0.00 0.17 0.74 0.05 1.00 
 Industry -0.21 0.00 -0.24 -0.21 0.28 -0.09 1.00 
2005 
ROS 1.00 
      ROA 0.59 1.00 
     ROE 0.37 0.65 1.00 
    Size 0.15 -0.26 -0.10 1.00 
   Risk 0.00 0.11 -0.18 -0.09 1.00 
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CSP 0.23 -0.07 0.00 0.60 -0.18 1.00 
 Industry -0.22 -0.02 -0.36 -0.21 0.23 -0.22 1.00 
2006 
ROS 1.00 
      ROA 0.25 1.00 
     ROE 0.30 0.59 1.00 
    Size 0.39 -0.12 0.01 1.00 
   Risk -0.11 0.02 -0.10 0.04 1.00 
  CSP 0.31 0.04 -0.08 0.60 0.16 1.00 
 Industry -0.34 0.15 -0.28 -0.25 0.18 -0.24 1.00 
2007 
ROS 1.00 
      ROA 0.53 1.00 
     ROE 0.53 0.80 1.00 
    Size 0.33 -0.07 0.11 1.00 
   Risk -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  CSP 0.35 0.11 0.10 0.63 0.22 1.00 
 Industry -0.27 0.01 -0.25 -0.28 0.19 -0.18 1.00 
2008 
ROS 1.00 
      ROA 0.50 1.00 
     ROE 0.32 0.52 1.00 
    Size 0.16 -0.17 -0.25 1.00 
   Risk -0.09 -0.14 -0.20 0.11 1.00 
  CSP 0.21 -0.15 -0.33 0.59 0.27 1.00 
 Industry -0.13 0.22 0.01 -0.29 0.12 -0.10 1.00 
2009 
ROS 1.00 
      ROA 0.39 1.00 
     ROE 0.16 0.61 1.00 
    Size 0.16 -0.33 -0.21 1.00 
   Risk 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.10 1.00 
  CSP -0.01 -0.25 -0.17 0.60 0.27 1.00 
 Industry -0.20 0.10 -0.11 -0.31 0.07 -0.10 1.00 
2010 
ROS 1.00 
      ROA 0.05 1.00 
     ROE 0.22 0.67 1.00 
    Size 0.43 -0.30 -0.13 1.00 
   Risk 0.04 0.12 0.19 0.13 1.00 
  CSP 0.09 -0.13 -0.09 0.53 0.26 1.00 
 Industry -0.26 0.19 -0.17 -0.38 0.09 -0.03 1.00 
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients – Market Data 
  
Market Return Size Stdev Beta CSP Industry 
2004 
Market Return 1.00 
     Size 0.01 1.00 
    Risk: Stdev -0.05 -0.01 1.00 
   Risk: Beta -0.32 0.64 0.14 1.00 
  CSP 0.00 0.66 -0.11 0.53 1.00 
 Industry -0.52 -0.08 0.05 0.18 -0.09 1.00 
2005 
Market Return 1.00 
     Size 0.08 1.00 
    Risk: Stdev 0.38 -0.11 1.00 
   Risk: Beta 0.32 0.67 0.02 1.00 
  CSP 0.11 0.57 -0.27 0.57 1.00 
 Industry -0.08 -0.06 0.27 -0.13 -0.22 1.00 
2006 
Market Return 1.00 
     Size 0.02 1.00 
    Risk: Stdev 0.20 0.37 1.00 
   Risk: Beta 0.11 0.70 0.60 1.00 
  CSP -0.04 0.59 0.03 0.48 1.00 
 Industry -0.07 -0.07 0.28 0.00 -0.24 1.00 
2007 
Market Return 1.00 
     Size -0.06 1.00 
    Risk: Stdev 0.09 0.40 1.00 
   Risk: Beta -0.07 0.69 0.56 1.00 
  CSP -0.25 0.61 0.16 0.58 1.00 
 Industry -0.04 -0.08 0.25 -0.10 -0.18 1.00 
2008 
Market Return 1.00 
     Size -0.03 1.00 
    Risk: Stdev -0.42 0.50 1.00 
   Risk: Beta -0.40 0.70 0.74 1.00 
  CSP -0.14 0.54 0.18 0.41 1.00 
 Industry 0.02 -0.05 0.34 0.10 -0.10 1.00 
2009 
Market Return 1.00 
     Size 0.08 1.00 
    Risk: Stdev 0.31 0.33 1.00 
   Risk: Beta 0.32 0.58 0.60 1.00 
  CSP -0.09 0.56 0.19 0.45 1.00 
 Industry 0.14 -0.06 0.35 -0.01 -0.10 1.00 
2010 
Market Return 1.00 
     Size 0.06 1.00 
    Risk: Stdev -0.39 -0.14 1.00 
   Risk: Beta -0.24 0.63 0.25 1.00 
  CSP -0.26 0.50 -0.16 0.35 1.00 
 Industry -0.14 -0.06 0.43 -0.08 -0.03 1.00 
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The highlighted correlation coefficients indicate explanatory variables whose correlation is 
high, i.e. greater than 0.40. However, it must be determined whether these correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
A rule of thumb was used to determine whether the correlation between two variables is 
significant. The correlation between two normal random variables is considered statistically 
significant if the sample correlation coefficient r is sufficiently large or sufficiently small. For 
a bivariate data set ( ){ }niyx ii ,,1:, K= , the sample correlation coefficient , r, is defined by 
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Has Student’s t-distribution with n-2 degrees of freedom. Therefore, when testing 
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Solving for r gives us ( ) ( )22 144 rnr −>−
 
and, in turn, 
n
r 42 > . Thus we reject the null 
hypothesis of zero correlation if 
n
r 2> .  
 
It was found that for the accounting data, the correlation between size and CSP is 
statistically significant. Therefore, since CSP is the independent variable of interest, size will 
be removed from the set of independent variables for the regression analysis. For the 
market data, it was found that the correlation between beta and CSP, as well as the 
correlation between size and CSP, are both statistically significant. Therefore, size was 
removed from the set of independent variables. In addition, since CSP and beta are 
correlated, the only risk measure used in modeling the relationship between CSP and CFP 
using market data is standard deviation. 
 
3.4. TESTS FOR NORMALITY 
The standard assumption in linear regression is that the theoretical residuals are 
independent and normally distributed. Carefully assessing the residuals can tell us whether 
the model used and the assumptions underlying the model are appropriate. Departures 
from the assumptions usually mean that the residuals contain structure that is not 
accounted for in the model. 
If the theoretical residuals are not exactly normally distributed, but the sample size is large 
enough then the Central Limit Theorem says that the usual inference based on the 
assumption of normality will still be approximately correct. However, because the sample 
size for this study is not large enough, it is important to test for normality. The residuals of 
the regression analysis were tested for normality using three tests – the Shapiro-Wilk test, 
the Anderson-Darling test and the Jarque-Bera test.  The null hypothesis for each of the tests 
is that the variable from which the sample was extracted follows a normal distribution. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the variable from which the sample was extracted does not 
follow a normal distribution. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any one of the 
tests, then it is assumed that the distribution is normal and the linear regression model can 
be used to model the data. 
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In addition to the above-mentioned tests for normality, diagnostic plots, such as quantile-
quantile (Q-Q) plots and histograms, were used to detect normality in the residuals. The Q-Q 
plot compares ordered values of a variable with quantiles of a specified theoretical 
distribution such as the normal distribution. If the data distribution matches the theoretical 
distribution, the points on the plot form a linear pattern. Thus, a Q-Q plot can be used to 
determine how well a theoretical distribution models a set of measurements. Figures 1 to 4 
below show the Q-Q plots for ROS, ROA, ROE and market return for the year 2004. 
 
Figure 1: Q-Q Plot for ROS – 2004 
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Figure 2: Histogram for ROS – 2004 
 
 
Figure 3: Q-Q Plot for ROA – 2004 
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Figure 4: Histogram for ROA – 2004 
 
 
Figure 5: Q-Q Plot for ROE – 2004 
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Figure 6: Histogram for ROE – 2004 
 
 
Figure 7: Q-Q Plot for Market Return – 2004 
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Figure 8: Histogram for Market Return – 2004 
 
 
For ROS and ROA, the null hypothesis could not be rejected for at least one of the tests. In 
addition, the Q-Q plots display only small departures from the straight line in the normal 
probability plot. For ROE and market return, the null hypothesis was rejected for all the 
tests. The Q-Q plots for ROE and market return show indications of departure from 
normality in the residual distributions. This means that for ROE and market return, the 
normality assumption is either violated or there are outliers in the data.  
 
Outliers are extreme values on either the independent or dependent variables or both. 
Outliers can occur as a result of observation errors, data entry errors, instrument errors 
based on layout or instructions or actual extreme values. Because outliers affect statistical 
analysis they must be explained, deleted or accommodated. The presence of outliers can 
lead to inflated error rates and substantial distortions of parameter and statistic estimates 
when using either parametric or nonparametric tests (Zimmerman, 1994).  Outliers generally 
increase error variance and reduce the power of statistical tests, and, if non-randomly 
distributed, they can decrease normality (Rasmussen, 1988; Schwager & Margolin, 1982; 
Zimmerman, 1994). Therefore, for this study, the outliers were deleted from the dataset. In 
all cases, it was found that when outliers were removed, the null hypothesis for at least one 
of the tests for normality could not be rejected. Figures 5 to 8 show the Q-Q plots and 
31 
 
histograms of the residuals after the outliers were removed for ROE and market return in 
2004.  
 
Figure 9: Q-Q Plot for ROE after removal of outliers – 2004 
 
 
Figure 10: Histogram of residuals for ROE after removal of outliers– 2004 
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Figure 11: Q-Q Plot for Market Return after removal of outliers– 2004 
 
 
Figure 12: Histogram of residuals for Market Return after removal of outliers – 2004 
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3.5. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
There has been a lack of consensus in literature about the appropriate measurement of 
corporate financial performance. Accounting-based measures and stock market-based 
measures of financial performance are subject to different biases. According to McGuire et 
al. (1988), accounting-based measures are subject to different accounting procedures and 
managerial manipulation. On the other hand, stock market-based measures may not reflect 
fair valuation of the company by different investors, especially where there is informational 
asymmetry. McWilliams et al. (2006) have noted that stock prices only relate to the 
valuation of the company by financial stakeholders and do not take into account the fact 
that a firm’s non-financial stakeholders are also affected by its CSR activities. In this study, 
both accounting-based and stock market-based measures of corporate financial 
performance are used. 
 
A regression model is used to investigate the relationship between corporate financial 
performance and corporate social performance. Margolis and Walsh (2001) reviewed a 
number of empirical studies and found that corporate social performance was used as the 
independent variable in most studies.  This study also follows the same methodology, where 
corporate financial performance is the dependent variable and corporate social performance 
is the independent variable. The following regression model is used to assess the association 
between CFP and CSP: 
tttttttttt XXXXY εββββα +++++= ,4,4,3,3,2,2,1,1  
Where Yt = financial performance in year t 
X1,t = a proxy for corporate social responsibility in year t (based on the JSE SRI Index) 
X2,t=a proxy for firm firm risk in year t 
X3,t= industry of firm  
ɛt = error term 
 
Following the paper by Chatterji et al (2007), the time-dependent relationship between CFP 
and CSP can be assessed using a distributed lag model.  However, according to Baltagi (1995) 
and Munoz (2005), when lagged dependent variables are included as explanatory variables 
estimators are biased and inconsistent, except when the number of time periods is large. 
Therefore, since the JSE SRI Index was launched in May 2004, the time period is too short to 
investigate the direction of causation between CFP and CSP. 
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3.6. CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Size, risk and industry have been used as control variables in previous empirical studies 
(Ullman, 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000) as they affect both the firms’ financial 
performance as well as the firm’s corporate social performance.  
 
Size is considered a relevant control variable because socially responsible behaviours of 
small and large firms are different. According to Burke et al. (1986), as firms mature and 
grow, they attract more attention from stakeholders, which may compel them to conduct 
their businesses in a more socially responsible fashion. Larger firms are generally thought to 
be inherently less risky than smaller firms. This is partly because larger firms can weather 
adverse economic shocks better than smaller firms can. However, size (both accounting size 
and market size) was found to be significantly correlated with CSP, and was therefore 
excluded from the model. 
 
The model used for this study also controls for industry-specific factors that have been 
shown to have an impact on firm performance. Chand (2006) argues that since industries 
operate in different contexts, and therefore differ in the way in which they deal with social, 
environmental and financial issues, industry should be a control variable. Industry is 
represented by dummy variables, which in our case results in the construction of 13 dummy 
variables representing the following industries: banks, beverages, chemicals, construction 
and materials, financial services, fixed line telecommunications, food and drug retailers, food 
producers, general industrials, healthcare equipment and services, mining, mobile 
telecommunications, and software and computer services. The companies in the sample 
were split into industries using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) industry 
classifications according to sectors. 
 
Griliches (1979) and McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argued for the inclusion of research and 
development (R&D) intensity in the econometric model as this measure is believed to be 
associated with companies’ long-run economic performance. However, Waddock and 
Graves (1997) contend that controlling for industry takes into account the differences in 
R&D intensity. Therefore, we follow this approach and do not control for R&D intensity. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. ACCOUNTING DATA 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis using CSP as the independent variable and 
ROS as the dependent variable, controlling for risk and industry. 
Table 5: ROS vs CSP  
Dependent Variable: ROS 
  
t-Stat p-value R2 Adj R2 F Stat Significance F 
2004 
Independent Variable: CSP 1.39 0.17 
          
0.10  
          
0.04  
          
1.62  
                 
0.20  
Intercept 3.24 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.94 0.35 
Industry -1.04 0.31 
2005 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.48 0.63 
          
0.07  
          
0.01  
          
1.10  
                
 0.36  
Intercept 3.34 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.85 0.40 
Industry -1.59 0.12 
2006 
Independent Variable: CSP 1.40 0.17 
          
0.05  
        
 -0.02 
          
0.71  
                 
0.55  
Intercept 2.44 0.02 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.42 0.67 
Industry -0.12 0.91 
2007 
Independent Variable: CSP 3.55 0.00 
          
0.26  
          
0.20  
          
4.55  
                 
0.01  
Intercept 2.14 0.04 
Control Variables 
  Risk -1.36 0.18 
Industry -0.18 0.85 
2008 
Independent Variable: CSP 2.26 0.03 
          
0.18  
          
0.11  
          
2.41  
                 
0.09  
Intercept 2.17 0.04 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.67 0.51 
Industry -0.12 0.91 
2009 
Independent Variable: CSP 1.29 0.20 
          
0.11  
          
0.05  
          
1.81  
                 
0.16  
Intercept 2.66 0.01 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.48 0.64 
Industry -1.63 0.11 
2010 
Independent Variable: CSP 2.00 0.05 
          
0.13  
          
0.07  
          
2.04  
                 
0.12  
Intercept 2.76 0.01 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.25 0.80 
Industry -0.99 0.33 
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When ROS is used as a measure of financial performance, CSP is statistically significant in explaining 
financial performance in 2007, 2008 and 2010. The adjusted R2 is very low in all the periods except 
2007 and 2008, when CSP is statistically significant. This shows that the explanatory variables have 
very little explanatory power over the dependent variable. The F statistics also show that the 
multivariate regression model does not have validity in fitting the data at the 10% level of 
significance, i.e. the probability that the regression coefficients are zero is very high. The only period 
in which the null hypothesis that the regression coefficients are zero can be rejected is 2007. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the regression analysis using CSP as the independent variable and 
ROA as the dependent variable, controlling for risk and industry. 
 
Table 6: ROA vs CSP 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
  
t-Stat p-value R2 Adj R2 F Stat Significance F 
2004 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.04 0.97 
0.01 -0.06 0.16 0.92 
Intercept 2.46 0.02 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.70 0.49 
Industry 0.19 0.85 
2005 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.24 0.81 
0.05 -0.02 0.71 0.55 
Intercept 1.91 0.06 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.44 0.66 
Industry 1.20 0.24 
2006 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.25 0.80 
0.06 0.00 0.95 0.42 
Intercept 1.71 0.09 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.18 0.86 
Industry 1.60 0.12 
2007 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.10 0.92 
0.07 0.00 1.01 0.40 
Intercept 2.25 0.03 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.30 0.76 
Industry 1.73 0.09 
2008 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.42 0.68 
0.11 0.05 1.71 0.18 
Intercept 1.61 0.11 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.60 0.55 
Industry 2.25 0.03 
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2009 
Independent Variable: CSP -1.75 0.09 0.09 0.02 1.30 0.29 
Intercept 3.03 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.03 0.98 
Industry 0.68 0.50 
2010 
Independent Variable: CSP -1.63 0.11 
0.15 0.08 2.38 0.08 
Intercept 3.16 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.08 0.94 
Industry 2.01 0.05 
 
Using ROA as a measure of financial performance, industry is statistically significant in explaining 
financial performance in 2007, 2008 and 2010. CSP is only statistically significant in 2009. At the 10% 
level of significance, the model has no explanatory power in all the periods except 2010. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the regression analysis using CSP as the independent variable and 
ROE as the dependent variable, controlling for risk, size, and industry. 
 
Table 7: ROE vs CSP 
Dependent Variable: ROE 
  
t-Stat p-value R2 Adj R2 F Stat Significance F 
2004 
Independent Variable: CSP -1.76 0.09 
0.12 0.06 1.94 0.14 
Intercept 5.24 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.71 0.48 
Industry -1.12 0.27 
2005 
Independent Variable: CSP -0.52 0.60 
0.14 0.07 2.08 0.12 
Intercept 5.17 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -1.89 0.07 
Industry -1.08 0.29 
2006 
Independent Variable: CSP -0.55 0.59 
0.10 0.03 1.37 0.27 
Intercept 5.78 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.37 0.71 
Industry -1.85 0.07 
2007 
Independent Variable: CSP -1.30 0.20 
0.12 0.05 1.68 0.19 
Intercept 8.09 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.45 0.65 
Industry -2.04 0.05 
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2008 
Independent Variable: CSP -1.09 0.28  
 
0.10 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
1.44 
 
 
0.25 
Intercept 5.51 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -1.40 0.17 
Industry 0.23 0.82 
2009 
Independent Variable: CSP -1.83 0.07 
0.10 0.04 1.56 0.21 
Intercept 4.72 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk 0.33 0.74 
Industry -1.31 0.20 
2010 
Independent Variable: CSP -2.60 0.01 
0.15 0.09 2.48 0.07 
Intercept 5.56 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -0.01 0.99 
Industry -0.50 0.62 
 
When ROE is used as a measure of financial performance, risk is statistically significant in explaining 
financial performance in 2005; industry is statistically significant in 2006 and 2007 and CSP is 
statistically significant in 2004, 2009 and 2010. The R2 and F statistics show that the model does not 
fit the data well in all the periods except 2010, at the 10% level of significance. 
 
As can be seen in Tables 5 to 7, the models show that CSP is not statistically significant at the 10% 
level of significance for most of the periods. The models also have weak explanatory power, as can 
be seen from the low adjusted coefficients of determination (adj R2) for all the periods. The F-
statistics of the models also show that the models are not a good fit for the data in most of the 
periods at the 10% level significance. This shows that accounting-based measures of financial 
performance are less reliable when predicted by the independent variables and CSP. 
 
4.2. MARKET DATA 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the regression analysis using CSP as the independent variable and 
stock market return as the dependent variable, controlling for industry and risk as measured by 
standard deviation of returns. 
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Table 8: Stock market return vs CSP, using standard deviation as risk measure 
Dependent Variable: Market Return 
  
t-Stat p-value R2 Adj R2 F Stat Significance F 
2004 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.33 0.74 
0.42 0.38 9.71 0.00 
Intercept 5.90 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -2.74 0.01 
Industry -4.75 0.00 
2005 
Independent Variable: CSP 1.46 0.15 
0.22 0.16 4.03 0.01 
Intercept 0.67 0.51 
Control Variables 
  Risk 3.35 0.00 
Industry -1.14 0.26 
2006 
Independent Variable: CSP 0.44 0.66 
0.11 0.05 1.72 0.18 
Intercept 0.92 0.36 
Control Variables 
  Risk 2.01 0.05 
Industry -0.74 0.46 
2007 
Independent Variable: CSP -2.06 0.05 
0.10 0.04 1.61 0.20 
Intercept 0.91 0.37 
Control Variables 
  Risk 1.12 0.27 
Industry -0.93 0.36 
2008 
Independent Variable: CSP -0.21 0.83 
0.21 0.16 3.97 0.01 
Intercept 0.74 0.46 
Control Variables 
  Risk -3.29 0.00 
Industry 1.28 0.21 
2009 
Independent Variable: CSP -1.02 0.31 
0.12 0.06 1.96 0.13 
Intercept 0.23 0.82 
Control Variables 
  Risk 2.16 0.04 
Industry 0.02 0.98 
2010 
Independent Variable: CSP -2.49 0.02 
0.26 0.21 5.08 0.00 
Intercept 4.76 0.00 
Control Variables 
  Risk -3.16 0.00 
Industry 0.33 0.74 
 
CSP is statistically significant in explaining stock market returns in 2007 and 2010 when standard 
deviation is used as a measure of risk. Risk is statistically significant in explaining stock market 
returns for all the years except 2007. Industry is significant in 2004. The F-statistics indicate that the 
regression model is a good fit for the data at the 10% level of significance in 2004, 2005, 2008 and 
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2010. For the same periods, the independent variables have strong explanatory power over market 
returns, as shown by the high adjusted R2. 
 
4.3. GOOD GOVERNANCE VS BAD GOVERNANCE PORTFOLIOS 
 
To further compare the financial performance between firms that are socially responsible and those 
that are not considered socially responsible, we create two equally weighted portfolios based on the 
inclusion or exclusion of a firm from the JSE SRI Index. A good governance portfolio that includes 
firms in the sample that are included in the JSE SRI Index in a particular year and a bad governance 
portfolio that comprises firms in the sample that are not included in the index were constructed.  
 
We then compare the average stock market returns of the constituents of the good governance and 
bad governance portfolios. The equal weighted good governance portfolio underperforms the equal 
weighted bad governance portfolio in all the periods but 2005, as shown in Table 9 below.  
 
Table 9: Good governance vs bad governance portfolios 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Risk-free rate 1% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8% 8% 
Market return 22% 43% 38% 16% -26% 29% 16% 
Good Governance Portfolio 
Portfolio Return 14% 39% 35% 11% -33% 22% 10% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.35 1.67 1.35 0.11 -1.26 0.71 0.12 
Treynor Measure 0.21 0.35 0.30 0.08 -0.35 0.20 0.08 
Bad Governance Portfolio 
Portfolio Return 14% 32% 37% 27% -23% 26% 22% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.31 0.66 0.72 0.57 -0.78 0.57 0.50 
Treynor Measure 0.21 0.35 0.30 0.08 -0.35 0.20 0.08 
 
In order to determine whether the means of the two portfolios are statistically different, we conduct 
the two-sample mean difference test to test the null hypothesis that the population means of two 
groups are equal. There two versions of the two sample t-test – one assumes that the two portfolios 
have equal variances and the other assumes unequal variances. Therefore, before conducting the t-
tests, we conduct the Fisher variance-ratio test (F-test) to determine if the variance of one portfolio 
is statistically significantly greater than the variance of the second portfolio. Thereafter, the 
appropriate t-test is performed. 
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We found that the variances of the two portfolios are statistically similar in 2004, 2007 and 2008. 
Therefore, for 2004, 2007 and 2008, the mean difference test assuming equal variance is used and 
the mean difference test assuming unequal variances is used for the rest of the periods under 
review. We found that the null hypothesis that the means of the two portfolios are equal cannot be 
rejected at the 10% level of significance for all the years except 2007. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that the good governance portfolio does not underperform the bad governance portfolio in all the 
periods except 2007. 
 
In addition to this, the good governance portfolio underperforms the market in all the years, as 
shown in Figure 13 below.  
 
Figure 13: Portfolio returns vs market return 
 
 
It is important to note that the portfolios were not corrected for industry effects and the observed 
performance may, therefore, be driven by industry effects. However, a study by Bauer et al (2008) 
corrected for industry or sector effects by subtracting sector returns from the individual stock 
returns and adding back the market return. They found that the results for portfolios adjusted for 
industry effects were similar to those for portfolios without sector corrections. 
 
We then compute the beta (systematic risk) of each portfolio using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM).  
( )fmfp RRRR −+= β
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Where Rp is the portfolio return, Rf is the risk-free rate and Rm is the market return. The risk-free rate 
in this case is the rate on the R157 bond. 
 
We find that the systematic risk of the good governance portfolio is lower than that of the bad 
governance portfolio for all the periods except 2005 and 2008. The standard deviation of the returns 
of the constituents of the good governance portfolio is also lower than the standard deviation of the 
bad governance portfolio (see Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Risk of the portfolios  
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Good Governance Portfolio 
Portfolio Beta 
 
          
0.62  
 
          
0.88  
 
          
0.90  
 
          
0.38  
 
          
1.21  
 
          
0.66 
  
          
0.25  
 
Standard deviation 0.37 0.18 0.20 0.29 0.33 0.19 0.17 
Bad Governance Portfolio 
Portfolio Beta 
          
0.64  
          
0.70  
          
0.98  
          
2.39  
          
0.92  
          
0.86  
          
1.68  
Standard deviation 
          
0.43  
          
0.37  
          
0.41  
          
0.34  
          
0.41  
          
0.31  
          
0.28  
 
As mentioned before, it was found that the variances (or standard deviation) of the two portfolios 
are statistically similar in 2004, 2007 and 2008. Therefore, from a market perspective, it can be 
argued that firms that display social responsibility experience less volatility in their share prices 
compared to less socially responsible firms. Also, it seems that, in general, the returns of socially 
responsible firms are less correlated to the returns of the market, whilst firms that are not socially 
responsible tend to be more sensitive to market movements. 
 
We also computed the risk-adjusted returns above the risk-free rate of return for the two portfolios 
in each period using systematic risk (Treynor measure) and total risk (Sharpe ratio). As shown in 
Figure 14, the two portfolios have the same systematic risk-adjusted returns in all the periods. In all 
the periods except 2007, 2008 and 2010, the good governance portfolio shows a higher Sharpe ratio 
than the bad governance portfolio. This shows that the good governance portfolio performs better 
than the bad governance portfolio even on a total risk-adjusted basis in most of the periods. 
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Figure 14: Risk-adjusted returns of the portfolios 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. ACCOUNTING DATA 
 
Based on the results of the regression models, we can conclude that there is a weak 
relationship between CSP and financial performance of companies listed on the JSE. This 
weak relationship is positive between ROS and CSP and negative between ROA and CSP, as 
well as between ROE and CSP. The results also show a strong, positive correlation between 
the size of a company and CSP, and the correlation between them is statistically significant 
at the 10% level of significance. According to Chen and Metcalf (1980), CSP and firm size may 
be positively linked as larger firms have a greater visibility. This greater visibility leads larger 
firms to invest in CSR activities than small firms which are less visible. The empirical study of 
Van der Laan et al. (2008) confirms this direct link. Larger firms may also be under more 
pressure from stakeholders, and may need to respond to these demands more attentively 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997). 
 
Ruf et al. (2001) found that change in CSR was positively associated with growth in sales and 
that ROS was positively associated with CSR for three financial periods. The positive 
relationship between ROS and CSP may be due to the fact that consumers of products and 
services are more predisposed to supporting companies with high CSP ratings. This finding is 
also supported by stakeholder theory, which proposes that a tension exists between the 
firm's explicit costs, such as debt repayments, and its implicit costs to other stakeholders, 
such as product quality and environmental costs. This theory predicts that a firm that 
attempts to lower its implicit costs by being socially irresponsible will incur higher explicit 
costs, resulting in competitive disadvantage. According to this argument, then, there should 
be a positive relationship between CSP and financial performance. Further, positive 
customer perceptions about the quality and nature of a company's products, its 
environmental awareness and its government and community relations are increasingly 
becoming bases of competition (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994). Such positive perceptions of 
the firm by outside stakeholders may lead to increased sales or reduced stakeholder 
management costs. 
 
A weak negative relationship was found to exist between ROA and CSP, as well as between 
ROE and CSP. This is in line with the argument that socially responsible firms incur a 
competitive disadvantage (Aupperle et al., 1985) because they are incurring costs that might 
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otherwise be avoided or that should be borne by others. According to this line of thinking, 
which is fundamental to Friedman's (1970) and other neoclassical economists' arguments, 
there are few readily measurable economic benefits to socially responsible behavior while 
there are numerous costs. These costs have a negative impact on the firm’s bottom line, 
reducing profits and, thus, shareholder wealth. Lankoski (2000) suggests that there exists an 
optimum level of CSP for firms and that deviations from this optimum may reduce CFP. This 
means that as CSP increases beyond a certain level, it begins to have a negative impact on 
financial performance. Salzmann (2008) agrees with this reasoning as excessive corporate 
social responsibility is extremely costly and would certainly reduce a firm’s bottom line.   
 
It is also interesting to note that the CSP-CFP relationship is only significant in later periods 
(predominantly 2009 and 2010). This may be because the very nature of CSP makes it more 
probable that its financial benefits will accrue in the long run. Hillman and Keim (2001) argue 
that improved CSP will result in “long term value through socially complex resources”. Cox et 
al. (2004) state that “there is a broad consensus in the conceptual literature that many 
financial gains from improved social performance accrue in the long run”. This may also 
point to a lead-lag relationship between CSP and CFP.  
 
We argue that the main reason for not finding a strong relationship between CSP and CFP is 
due to the complex, non-linear relationship between the two variables. Waddock and 
Graves (1997) argue that CFP and CSP are not directly linked due to the complex 
environment in which firms operate. Cobb et al (2001) and Boone and Rubenstein (1997) 
have also suggested that the CSP/CFP relationship is not direct. Corporate social 
performance is a multidimensional construct defined by Carroll (1979) as having four 
components: economic responsibility to investors and consumers, legal responsibility to the 
government or the law, ethical responsibilities to society, and discretionary responsibility to 
the community. Therefore, we argue that there may be aspects of CSP that are value-
creating for the firm and aspects that do not enhance the value of the firm. This may lead to 
the inconclusive evidence when using different measures of CFP, such as was found in this 
study. Hillman and Keim (2001) divided CSP into the two dimensions – stakeholder 
management and social issue participation, where stakeholder management relate to 
measures that are directly related to primary stakeholders (employees, customers, 
community, environmental relations and suppliers). They found that the two CSP measures 
have opposing relationships to financial performance, and that this may partially explain 
why aggregating the two together into a measure of corporate social performance may lead 
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to ambiguous results. It may be useful, as Hillman and Keim (2001) suggest, to disaggregate 
the CSP measure. Furthermore, Hillman and Keim (2001) assert that their operationalisation 
of financial performance, using market value added, may be an improvement over 
accounting measures of return in understanding the effect of intangible assets such as 
stakeholder relationships. Therefore, we argue that, as used in this study, the CSP measure is 
too complex to be linearly related to CFP, and thus, to display a significantly strong 
relationship with CFP. 
 
The conflicting results obtained when using accounting measures of CFP may be indicative of 
the inherent weaknesses of accounting measures of financial performance in this sort of 
analysis. First, accounting measures of firm performance are inherently more short term in 
nature (Fisher and McGowan, 1983), tap only historical aspects of performance (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001) and are subject to a great degree of manipulation by managers (McGuire et al., 
1988; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Therefore, accounting measures of performance, such 
as ROA and ROE, may be less useful because they are not successful in capturing the long-
term value of the company or value created for shareholders. In addition, accounting 
measures of performance have difficulty capturing intangible relationships (Barney, 1991), 
such as those with stakeholders. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) point out that it is extremely 
difficult to capture the value of customer service or reputation on a balance sheet. 
Therefore, Hillman and Keim (2001) contend that accounting measures of performance are 
better suited for measuring tangible asset utilization and, thus, are inadequate for capturing 
shareholder value creation. 
 
The other reason we propose for the weak relationship between CSP and CFP in the South 
African market is that the investment universe in this market is small and the majority of 
investors in this market are institutional investors, and institutional investors are typically 
long-term investors. As a result, the evidence of the relationship between CSP and CFP may 
be very weak because investors may not change their investment holdings based on a 
company’s CSP. Therefore, CSP may not be as significant in determining the constitution of 
investors’ portfolios, and therefore, companies’ financial performance as in larger markets. 
In support of this argument, Teoh and Shiu (1990) examined the attitudes of institutional 
owners toward CSP and sources of information about it. They found that institutional 
investors did not normally alter their investment decisions on the basis of company 
assertions about CSP contained in conventional financial information such as annual reports.  
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5.2. MARKET DATA 
 
When using market data, we found that risk is statistically significant in explaining market 
return for most of the periods. This is consistent with portfolio theory developed by 
Markowitz (1959). According to this theory, an investor should only assess an investment 
opportunity in terms of risk and return. According to Leon (2007), if investors are risk averse, 
a positive relationship should exist between stock return and volatility. This is because risk-
averse investors demand higher risk premiums to compensate for additional risk. Various 
researchers have examined and found a positive relationship between stock return and 
volatility (French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Chou, 1988). This may explain the 
explanatory power of risk in determining financial performance from 2004 to 2010 
(excluding 2007).  
 
On the other hand, CSP was only statistically significant in 2007 and 2010, and the 
relationship between CSP and CFP is negative. Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006) find that 
companies with low (high) CSP scores outperform (underperform) the market. They found 
that both employment and environmental indicators are negatively correlated with stock 
returns. Their argument implies that investing in CSR is destructive of shareholder value. 
Vance (1975) found that corporations displaying strong social credentials experienced 
declining stock prices relative to the market average. Curran and Moran (2007) examined 
whether corporate financial performance is affected by public endorsement of 
environmental and social performance using an event study methodology. They used firms’ 
inclusion in and deletion from the FTSE4Good UK Index as a proxy for good or poor 
corporate social responsibility. Their results show that the movements in the daily returns of 
the firms due to positive and negative announcements regarding environmental and social 
performance are not significant. Their data also do not suggest that a firm’s presence on the 
index brings it any significant financial return for signaling its corporate social responsibility.  
 
Albeit weak, this negative relationship between CSP and market return may be due to 
several reasons. Firstly, companies listed on the JSE SRI Index are required to demonstrate a 
commitment to black economic empowerment (BEE). However, operations of multinational 
companies outside of South Africa and companies without South African operations are not 
required to provide data on BEE indicators. Furthermore, whereas companies are required 
to meet more than one core indicator for other evaluation criteria, companies operating in 
South Africa must meet at least one core indicator in BEE. This means that the weighting 
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given to BEE may not be significant. In South Africa, BEE represents a CSR activity that 
benefits the previously disadvantaged population. Alessandri et al. (2011) investigated 
whether BEE can represent a value-creating CSR action and found that South African firms 
that engaged in BEE transactions that were completed at a discount experienced positive 
and significant average shareholder returns. This may mean that investors place more value 
on BEE statuses of companies listed on the JSE than on CSP as determined by listing on the 
JSE SRI Index. Secondly, investors in the South African market may see corporate social 
responsibility as a window dressing device. This may cause investors to penalise socially 
responsible companies for the cost of CSR activities, as they are perceived to be of little 
value. Thirdly, it may be that philanthropic shareholders may be willing to substitute 
potentially higher returns to feel morally at ease with the stocks they own. This would lead 
to lower required returns for socially responsible companies. Also, because of the costs 
associated with CSR activities, the earnings of socially responsible companies may be lower 
and the market may punish these companies, resulting in lower share prices. Finally, 
investors may be unwilling to pay a premium for socially responsible behavior. 
 
Our study also showed that, on a non-risk adjusted basis, the good corporate governance 
portfolio underperformed the market in all the periods and underperformed the bad 
governance portfolio in most periods. However, the mean difference test showed that the 
means of the two portfolios are statistically equal in all the periods except 2007. Therefore, 
we can deduce that the bad governance portfolio only outperformed the good governance 
portfolio at the beginning of the economic recession. However, both portfolios have the 
same systematic risk-adjusted return and the good governance portfolio has a higher total 
risk-adjusted return that the bad governance portfolio in all the periods except 2007, 2008 
and 2010. It is interesting to note that the periods when the good governance portfolio 
experienced lower total risk-adjusted returns coincide with the economic recession period. 
This may be an indication that investors place less value on CSP during periods of high 
volatility. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. LIMITATIONS 
 
The JSE SRI Index was constituted in 2004. Therefore, only 7 years of data were available for 
the study. As more CSP data become available and as time goes on, it would be useful to 
determine whether the results obtained in this study hold consistently over time. In the long 
term, the results may show a positive effect on the bottom line of companies included in the 
index. The limited time period also does not facilitate investigation of the variability of the 
CSP–CFP relationship across time. According to Hill et al (2007), the correlation between CSR 
and CFP is observable in the long term. 
 
Another limitation of this study is the small sample size.  The cross-sectional design of the 
study and limited time period also made it difficult to examine the direction of causality. 
 
6.2. CONCLUSION 
 
This study has attempted to address what has become a recurrent question: whether 
corporate social performance is linked to corporate financial performance. There is 
extensive debate concerning the legitimacy and value of being a socially responsible 
business. There are different views about the role of a company in society and disagreement 
as to whether wealth maximization for shareholders should be the sole goal of a 
corporation.  
 
Agency theory suggests that companies with better corporate governance standards 
perform better. Therefore, the addition of a company to the JSE SRI Index should be a signal 
to the market that the company has reached a certain level of environmental and social 
performance. The expectation is that since stakeholders are increasingly looking beyond 
financial indicators when making investment decisions, companies listed on the JSE SRI Index 
should perform better financially. This study has shown, paradoxically, that firms listed on 
the JSE which are perceived as having met social responsibility and good corporate 
governance criteria do not have better financial performance than other firms. The findings 
indicate that, for all but one of the accounting measures of CFP and for market returns, CSP 
is not positively related to financial performance. The relationship between CSP and CFP was 
also found to be weak.  
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We argue that CSP is a complex, multidimensional construct. The key features of the JSE SRI 
Index are split along 3 dimensions – social, environmental and economic sustainability. 
Therefore, like Hillman and Keim (2001), we argue that using corporate resources to pursue 
social issues that are not directly related to the relationship with primary stakeholders may 
not create value for the firm.  The relationship between CFP and CSP may also not be linear, 
due to the complex nature of the CSP measure used in this study. The conflicting results 
given by the different accounting measures of CFP may be an indication of the inherent 
weakness of accounting measures in capturing intangible relationships, such as social 
responsibility.  
 
In all cases, CSP was found to be statistically significant in explaining CFP in the more recent 
of the periods coinciding with the period during and after the economic recession. There 
may be two reasons for this. Firstly, it may point to the fact that the financial benefits of CSP 
only accrue in the long term. Secondly, it may be an indication of a lead-lag relationship 
between CSP and CFP. 
 
This study did not attempt to investigate the non-financial benefits of CSP. CSP may have 
positive external effects on a firm’s reputation. According to the reputation perspective, 
firm’s disclosure about its level of CSP may help build a positive image with customers, 
investors, bankers, and suppliers (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Furthermore, firms with high 
CSP reputation ratings may improve relations with bankers and investors and thus facilitate 
greater access to capital. Other benefits of CSP may include the ability to attract better 
employees and increase current employees’ goodwill. Therefore, the results of this study do 
not negate the positive effects of good corporate governance and CSP.  
 
6.3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
A potentially informative study would be the assessment of the impact of companies’ entries 
into or exits from the JSE SRI Index. The study would be beneficial in determining whether 
the event itself has an impact on the fundamental value of the stock. 
 
In addition to this, we argue that the relationship between CSP and CFP may not be linear. 
Therefore, it may be useful to develop a non-linear model to investigate the relationship 
between CSP and CFP.  
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The role of a corporation in society and the perception of the relative importance of its CSR 
activities may be influenced by a country’s unique cultural and economic environment. The 
country’s specific cultural context may contribute to shaping investment behavior. 
Furthermore, there may be aspects of the CSP measure that stakeholders place greater 
value on than others. Therefore, although the comprehensiveness of the JSE SRI Index 
criteria is useful, it may be useful to investigate the effects of the different components of 
CSR, such as BEE and environmental pollution, on CFP rather than using an aggregate 
measure of CSP.  
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APPENDIX A 
Definitions of performance measures 
 
Return on sales (ROS) ratio is widely used to evaluate a company's operational efficiency. ROS is also 
known as a firm's "operating profit margin". It is calculated using this formula: 
 
Sales
PBIT
ROS =
 
where PBIT is the profit before interest and tax. 
Return on assets (ROA) is a measure of operating performance of how well assets have been 
employed since being received by a firm. For our purposes, it is measured as  
AssetsTotalAverage
PBIT
ROA =  
 
Return on equity (ROE) ratio measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how much profit a 
company generates with the money shareholders have invested. It is computed as follows: 
 
EquityrsShareholdeAverage
IncomeNet
ROE
'
=  
 
Treynor developed a performance measure according to the post-capital market line (CML). 
However, he used the beta of a portfolio to measure systematic risk. The higher the Treynor 
indicator, the better the portfolio performs. The Treynor measure is computed as follows 
p
fp
p
RR
T
β
−
=
 where Tp is the Treynor indicator of the portfolio, Rp is the portfolio return, Rf is the risk-free rate and 
βp is the beta of the portfolio. 
 
The Sharpe ratio was proposed by Sharpe according to the post-CML. Sharpe used the standard 
deviation of the rate of return on an investment portfolio to measure total financial risk, as he 
assumed that investors had not diversified their risks. The higher the Sharpe indicator, the better the 
portfolio performs. The Sharpe measure is calculated as 
p
fp
p
RR
S
σ
−
=
 where Sp indicates the Sharpe measure of the portfolio and σp is the standard deviation of the 
portfolio. 
